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In the People’s Republic of China, much like in the rest of the world, con-sumption rates for electrical and electronic appliances (hereinafter e-ap-pliances, i.e. television sets, computers, mobile phones, refrigerators,
air-conditioners, etc.) have soared in recent decades, and the trend shows no
signs of weakening. (1) Due to their rapid obsolescence, these consumer goods
are also discarded in ever greater numbers. (2) What becomes of them is there-
fore a matter of concern, especially for the environment. But the question of
how to deal with these objects is a complex one, for several reasons. First,
they form a heterogeneous category, which includes a multitude of devices,
components, and materials, the properties of which vary greatly. Some of
them are technologically elaborate or require a wealth of resources to make,
transform, or unmake, while others are relatively simple. Some fetch high
prices and have dedicated global markets, whereas others lack any commer-
cial value. Some contain toxic substances that, if released, can damage the
environment and human health. Others, by contrast, are rather harmless.
Second, the design and adoption of an official system for dealing with dis-
carded e-appliances is a highly political issue. The validation by state au-
thorities of certain technologies and business models as appropriate, and
the parallel condemnation of others, reveals a particular conception of what
these objects are and where their value lies. It also implies a decision about
to whom they should be entrusted and for what purpose. The parameters
of a given “waste regime,” a concept I borrow from Zsusza Gille, (3) result
from power struggles and have far-reaching consequences. They guide ma-
terial and financial flows into new directions, make certain social actors
more legitimate than others – thus allowing them to play a predominant
role – and affect the quality of the environment. 
In China, the market for used e-appliances has undergone important
changes in recent years. Small but well-networked economic actors, who
used to have a collective monopoly on the trade and transformation of
these commodities, are now starting to face competition from big industrial
groups backed by the central government, academia, and the media as well
as international and non-governmental organisations. The latter coalition (4)
has framed the issue as an environmental one by insisting on the pollution
caused by small-scale recycling workshops and claims that the establish-
ment of a state-sanctioned system would put an end to this.
Against this assumption, which has now become commonplace, I argue in this
article that genuine concern for the environment plays only a secondary role in
the central government’s endorsement of a recycling system centred on material
recovery and tailor-made for large industrial groups. Rather, this evolution is to
be understood in terms of the dynamics of competition between those who
control the trade at present and those who seek to control it in the future.
This claim is based on several insights, two of which need to be highlighted
up front. First, China’s state-led “system for the management of waste elec-
trical and electronic equipment (WEEE)” (dianzi dianqi feiqiwu guanli zhidu
电子电器废弃物管理制度) is not nearly as green as its proponents would
have people believe. The so-called “formal” (zhenggui 正规) and “informal”
(fei zhenggui 非正规) sectors of the economy (5) are often juxtaposed when
it comes to judging environmental performance, and in the vast majority
of cases, the comparison is based on one sole criterion, namely the impact
of dismantling and processing activities. This is supposed to – and generally
does – make big recycling plants seem cleaner and more efficient than small
recycling workshops. To be fair, however, one should also take into account
at least two additional factors: 
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(a) the multitude of other activities in which actors belonging to the in-
formal sector engage as well – and which are systematically ignored, down-
played, or criticised. Indeed, resale, reuse, repair, refurbishment, repurposing,
salvaging, etc. take place on a large scale in China. Not only do these prac-
tices cause little – if any – pollution, they also have the merit of extending
product lifespan, thus limiting the need for raw materials to be extracted
from the earth’s crust or from scrap; (6)
(b) the environmental impact of large licensed plants’ back-end treatment
operations. Evidence from my research suggests pollution at this level easily
goes unchecked, which tallies with a manifest dearth of reliable, compre-
hensive, or simply published data.
Second, the precise characteristics of the “management system” devised
by central state authorities in order to determine the fate of discarded e-
appliances in China seem to be best explained by national policies that have
little to do with environmental protection. I think here in particular of efforts
to boost domestic consumption; to support the country’s main manufac-
turers and retailers of electrical and electronic appliances; to better control
the recycling industry and its profits; and to exhibit China’s command of
advanced, complex technologies as proof that it is – slowly but surely –
making its way into the select club of “developed countries” (fada guojia 发
达国家). Claims that state and industry are striving to minimise their envi-
ronmental impact must be viewed in light of these priorities and with a
good dose of scepticism toward green propaganda.
This study exposes the first results of my multi-sited ethnographic re-
search on the fate of so-called “e-waste” (dianzi laji 电子垃圾) in China.
Most of my fieldwork was done in the Pearl River Delta, where I spent a
total of one year between 2014 and 2015, and in the Beijing-Tianjin area. I
mainly “follow[ed] the thing,” as George Marcus describes investigative
methods that consist in tracking objects wherever they take centre stage. (7)
This led me to sites as different as repair shops, scrap yards, harbours, sec-
ond-hand markets, conference halls, media websites, and legal texts. It also
allowed me to meet the people who deal with discarded e-appliances – or
the things from/into which they morph (8) – on a daily basis and to get a
sense of their actions and motivations. A total of 52 interviews were con-
ducted with state officials, environmental activists, scientists, journalists,
scrap dealers and recyclers, refurbishers and repairers, etc. Following Gille’s
advice, I investigated the ways in which so-called “e-waste” is not only
treated, but also generated and portrayed, (9) as these are all fundamental
aspects of a waste regime.
This article is divided into four sections. The first one traces the social con-
struction of “e-waste” as a public problem affecting China and exposes its
influence on the quest for solutions. In the second section, I look at what
happens to discarded e-appliances on the ground, identify key market play-
ers, describe their practices and technologies, and assess their respective
strengths and weaknesses. The third section is devoted to attempts to trans-
form this market and focuses on how green propaganda is mobilised by
some as a tool to gain a competitive edge. In the fourth and final section, I
suggest links between the evolution of China’s e-waste regime and recent
developments in different yet related fields.
China: The world’s e-waste dump
The issue of discarded electrical and electronic appliances started to receive
public attention throughout the world in the 2000s, due mainly to reports
published by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (10) and the media, (11)
and quickly reached the status of global problem. (12) “E-waste,” as it became
known, was socially constructed (13) from the outset in terms of global injus-
tice and environmental damage. To this day, the vast majority of accounts
emphasise “illegal” exports from rich “developed” countries, which allegedly
“dump” their waste onto poor, “developing” ones, and the pollution caused
by small workshops in which this high tech equipment is dismantled and
processed using “primitive” or “outdated” recycling technologies, such as
open air burning and acid baths. (14) In this narrative, China came to be known
as the “world’s largest e-waste dumpsite” (15) – an appellation that evokes,
and contrasts with, its reputation as the “world’s factory.” 
There is no reason to question the veracity of these accounts, or to down-
play their role in raising awareness on the implications of mass consump-
tion. At the same time, however, this framing of the “e-waste problem” has
become a genre in itself that now tends to be taken for granted and repro-
duced unquestioningly.
It is significant that of all media and NGO reports, the one that arguably
had the greatest impact (16) dealt at length with the issue of discarded e-
appliances in China. This report focused the world’s attention on Guiyu 贵
屿, a small town located in Guangdong Province that subsequently became
e-waste’s first poster child. It also inextricably tied the issue of discarded e-
appliances to images of migrant workers inhaling toxic fumes, of children
playing barefoot on mountains of broken plastic cases, and of rivers turned
black. In the years following this report's publication, Guiyu achieved infamy
throughout China, especially when domestic media coverage described it
as one of the country’s most polluted places. (17)
Chinese scientists participated in drawing attention to the pollution
caused by “primitive” recycling technologies. Scores of studies were pub-
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lished in the field of toxicology on, for instance, lead levels in children’s
blood (18) or human DNA damage, (19) with the aim of quantifying the reper-
cussions of these activities and proving their harmful nature. (20) In general,
results are conclusive. 
The scientific community in China also played, and continues to play, an
important role in the conception and handling of used e-appliances as a
form of waste. The discourse on “e-waste” or “waste electrical and electronic
equipment” (WEEE), (21) which now dominates in academic and policy-mak-
ing circles around the world, implies that solutions are to be sought in the
field of “waste management” (feiwu guanli 废物管理). In China, research on
discarded e-appliances therefore focuses on material recovery and pollution
control, (22) and is mostly conducted by specialists of environmental sciences. 
The shredder ideology and its corollaries
Institutional experts’ approach denotes an understanding of recycling as
“resource recovery” (zaisheng ziyuan 再 生 资 源 or ziyuanhua 资 源 化 ),
namely the transformation of manufactured objects (computers, tele-
phones) “back” into the materials they are composed of: plastics, aluminium,
copper, gold, etc. (23) Discarded e-appliances are seen as having reached the
end of their lives; they have no usefulness as appliances anymore, but may,
and should, be resuscitated as “raw materials” (yuanliao 原料), a process
that experts tellingly refer to as “urban mining” (chengshi kuangchan 城市
矿产). An American scientist I interviewed dubbed this the “shredder ideol-
ogy” and claimed that it prevailed in governmental, industrial, and academic
circles in China. He pointed out that crushing, sorting, and extracting appear
to be the obvious way to deal with discarded electrical and electronic ap-
pliances, even though other methods exist, some of which are “much more
eco-efficient.”
E-appliances’ environmental impact by far exceeds the sole issue of back-
end waste management. (24) However, other issues have received compara-
tively little attention from the Chinese scientific community thus far. Work
addressing the impact of product design on the longevity and potential tox-
icity of discarded appliances is scarce – despite the fact that several Chinese
regulations promote the principle of eco-design. (25) Likewise, investigations
into practices of reuse, repair, and refurbishment are largely lacking, (26) al-
though these practices are widespread in China. When asked to explain this,
an employee of the Chinese Academy of Sciences who works on “a very
small project on reuse” told me it was hard to get public funding for this
type of research. Finally, manufacturing processes, which are known to gen-
erate a considerable amount of hazardous by-products and to affect the
environment and human health, (27) do not figure prominently in Chinese
scientists’ program on “e-waste.”
As is often the case with issues of waste, the status of discarded appliances
affects that of the people who handle them. In China, the latter suffer from
a thoroughly negative image. Interestingly, whereas accounts from European
and North American sources give Asian and African small-scale recyclers
the role of victims, those produced within mainland China on places such
as Guiyu or Taizhou (28) make these people appear as both victims and per-
petrators. News articles, for instance, stress the illegal activities that local
business people engage in, such as smuggling, corruption, and tax eva-
sion. (29) Academics and environmental activists described them to me as
being unruly, ruthless, or greedy, too steeped in their traditions to change.
Such prejudices reflect the fact that these people are widely held responsible
for the negative impact of discarded e-appliances.
It must be noted that the prevalent negative attitude towards the so-
called “informal” sector of recycling is seldom based on a comprehensive
evaluation of its impact. The vast majority of scientific studies concern
themselves with the shape, efficiency, and future evolution of the “formal
system” (zhenggui zhidu 正规制度), which refers to national and interna-
tional regulations and policies, as well as to technologies used, or likely to
be used, by large recycling companies. Research on the multitude of entities
that make up the so-called “informal” sector and the various ways in which
they deal with discarded e-appliances is lacking. (30)
Scaling up the industry
To this day, the great majority of discarded e-appliances in China lands in
the hands of economic actors that are small-scale, privately owned, and
linked into vast networks. (31) Historical reasons largely account for this.
When China embarked on economic reforms in the late 1980s and 1990s,
state actors progressively disengaged from a number of sectors and private
actors took over. In the case of recycling (in general), the latter were mainly
people originating from the countryside. (32) For them, switching from farm-
ing to scrap collecting, dealing, dismantling, and/or processing was a way
to improve their modest earnings. Some of them made a fortune, thanks
to good commercial skills and, more importantly, favourable business con-
ditions. The country’s rapid growth, in particular in the areas of construction
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and manufacturing, required huge quantities of raw materials, and dealers
in “secondary resources” were in a position to supply China’s factories –
generally by importing scrap from overseas. (33) Discarded e-appliances
served as a source of not only plastics and metals, but also of cheap com-
ponents with which devices could be repaired or refurbished, (34) or as af-
fordable second-hand consumer goods.
The sector of “e-waste” recycling was long characterised by a near absence
of state intervention. But this situation has changed in recent years, and
the central government now seeks to control it. Although the first attempts
at regulating the trade date back to the early 2000s, it was not until the
early 2010s that tangible results were achieved: the central government
succeeded in triggering the emergence of new players in the field, namely
large scrap processing companies (chuli qiye 处理企业). The policies and
regulations currently in place are exclusively oriented toward the latter,
shaped in ways consistent with their needs and capabilities and aimed at
promoting their interests. They require centralised operations, vast facilities,
state-of-the-art industrial equipment, automated processes, comprehensive
information management systems, and most importantly, an exclusive
focus on material recovery. This makes compliance all but impossible for
the majority of actors who currently control flows of discarded e-appliances
in China, and therefore excludes them from the country’s “formal system
of WEEE management.” (35)
In public statements, experts claim that it is necessary to “increase the
scale” of the industry (chanye guimohua 产业规模化), which clearly trans-
lates into prioritising and promoting big companies. They talk of “standar-
dising” or “normalising” the industry (chanye guifanhua 产业规范化 or
zhengguihua 正规化), or in other words of increasing the level of conformity
with rules and regulations. Since the Chinese WEEE Directive and related
legal texts are not designed to accommodate self-employed workers, indi-
vidual entrepreneurs, and privately owned small enterprises (getihu 个体户
or sanhu 散户), (36) this implies doing away with these actors. Attempts to
scale up the industry are an important element in the current waste
regime’s transformation.
Getting rid of “dismantling workshops” (chaijie zuofang 拆解作坊), for in-
stance, is a deliberate objective for government agencies. A high-ranking
official of China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) explained to
me: “We are cracking down on them and using economic methods to pro-
mote their competitors. The more big recycling plants there are, the harder
it will be for small workshops to survive.” The official also acknowledged
that “crackdowns are not particularly effective, since workshops often re-
open or relocate soon after they are closed down, but we believe economic
methods can achieve good results.” “Economic methods” basically consist
in subsidies (butie 补贴) allocated to state-registered, licensed companies.
The central government introduced them in two phases. In the first one, it
sought to kick-start the “formal” recycling sector by launching a take-back
program called “Home Appliance Old-for-New Rebate Program” (jiadian yi
jiu huan xin zhengce 家电以旧换新政策). (37) This program ran from 2009 to
2011 and was fully financed with state funds. It encouraged consumers all
over China to sell their unwanted devices exclusively to registered and au-
thorised collectors in order to receive a discount on the purchase of new
ones in large retail stores such as Gome (Guomei 国美) and Suning 苏宁.
The program was quite effective in supplying “e-waste” to new recycling
plants, which were securing very little at the time, but it proved too expen-
sive for the government, and collection rates dropped as soon as it ended.
In a second phase, which has lasted until today, the central government
shifted the financial burden onto producers (shengchanzhe 生产者, i.e. man-
ufacturers and importers) by making it mandatory to pay a tax on each ap-
pliance put on the Chinese market. The money thus collected goes into a
state-managed fund (jijin 基金) and is then redistributed to recyclers, who
receive a fixed amount per processed “item” (i.e. full appliance). The whole
purpose of the subsidy is to give licensed recyclers a comparative advantage
on the market and make them competitive. At the end of 2014, more than
100 companies were receiving financial support in the form of subsidies.
All of them depend on it for their survival. In fact, some plants even inter-
rupted or slowed down their lines in 2015 due to delayed payments from
the government. In major cities, one generally finds at least one recycling
company with strong ties to state authorities.
The central government is more tolerant towards small actors involved in
the collection of discarded e-appliances, at least for now. In China, most
unwanted objects (old television sets, worn-out clothes, cardboard boxes,
etc.) are gathered, sorted, and pre-processed by “rubbish collectors” (called
shou polan de ren 收破烂的人 or, euphemistically, xiaoshangfan 小商贩),
and then sold to specialised “privately-owned scrap stations” (siying
feipinzhan 私营废品站) or “small scrapyards” (xiao huochang 小货场). The
people running these businesses are often members of China’s “floating
population” (liudong renkou 流动人口). They operate with great economic
efficiency, cutting down on all costs (transportation, labour, equipment,
etc.), and they control the “last mile,” a key feature according to experts in
reverse logistics. In other words, they are in immediate contact with the
source of discarded e-appliances and therefore play a crucial role in the sup-
ply chain. 
In today’s China, doing without them would be tricky. Local authorities
largely rely on them for the management of municipal solid waste. For in-
stance, Guangzhou’s city management (chengguan 城管) urges residents
to “go and sell what can be sold” (neng mai na qu mai 能卖拿去卖), which,
in the absence of true alternatives, amounts to (tacitly) endorsing rubbish
collectors. State-registered recyclers also depend on the latter for their sup-
ply of discarded e-appliances. They are allowed to source from these people,
for the system is currently based on the principle of “multichannel collec-
tion” (duoqudao huishou 多渠道回收). But this may change in the future,
since government and academic experts call for an “integration” (yitihua
一体化) of the collection network. Although they rarely give details on the
implementation of this process, experiments currently being conducted
throughout China (38) indicate that self-employed migrant workers would
be left with, at best, a minor role to play. (39)
In general, the progressive waning of the “informal” sector of “e-waste”
recycling is largely regarded by scientists, environmentalists, and corporate
or government representatives as an ineluctable and, on the whole, desirable
evolution. Those I interviewed think that, in time, not only polluting work-
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shops will vanish, but also self-employed rubbish collectors, privately-owned
scrap stations, family-operated scrapyards, etc. In specialised conferences,
the “informal” sector is rarely mentioned, or only in passing and in thor-
oughly negative terms. Several of my non-Chinese informants even reported
that when they tried to discuss the issue with their Chinese counterparts,
they were told, “There is no informal sector in China.” Such a forthright de-
nial may be uncommon, but it is symptomatic of a widespread inability to
acknowledge the role and importance of these people. (40)
Guiyu’s industrial park represents an interesting case in point because it
reveals how long and bumpy the “formalisation” road can be. In 2005, the
central government declared Guiyu the country’s first “circular economy
experimentation point” (xunhuan jingji shidian 循环经济试点). Five years
later, the government of Guangdong Province made the construction of a
“demonstration park” for “comprehensive recycling” (zonghe liyong chanye
shifanyuan 综合利用产业示范园) one of its priority programs. A vast stretch
of land was therefore made available for the construction of what was to
become a flagship industrial park. For years, however, the park remained al-
most empty; Guiyu’s recyclers refused to move in. Only recently have some
started to do so – after having received threats from the neighbouring city's
Environmental Protection Bureau. But the type of operations conducted in
the park today are not the most problematic ones, and the methods used
there do not fundamentally differ from those encountered outside. In other
words, the result remains a far cry from expectations. 
The recent crackdown on small workshops in the town of Longtang (Long-
tang zhen 龙塘镇), another well-known processing hub located in Guang-
dong Province that has been active for years, also reveals that local
governments benefit from the trade in terms of revenue and only intervene
when ordered to do so by higher authorities.
Primacy thanks to a diversified strategy
When considered at all, small economic actors are portrayed as the source
of an unfair competition that allegedly diverts goods away from the “for-
mal” sector. (41) Indeed, despite the financial support “formal companies”
(zhenggui qiye 正规企业) receive from the central government, they have
only been processing relatively small quantities of used e-appliances thus
far, (42) at least compared with the total volume generated each year in
China. Experts tend to blame this shortage of goods on the “informal” sector,
arguing that small, independent economic actors manage to offer higher
prices than state-registered companies because, unlike them, they are not
compelled to comply with regulations. This allows them to save on a wide
range of costs, especially those related to pollution control, (43) which are
said to be especially high. Such statements are true, but also simplistic. Get-
ting away with polluting can help enhance one’s profit – as the literature
on “pollution havens” (44) demonstrates – yet it hardly represents a business
model in itself.
My fieldwork suggests that small and independent economic actors’ com-
petitive advantage results less from their disrespect for the law than from
the fact that they can choose from a vast array of practices, some of which
fall within the scope of the law whereas others do not. Big, licensed Chinese
“e-waste” recycling companies operating in China do not have such an op-
tion. They calculate purchasing prices based on two factors: the subsidy they
can claim from the government and the selling prices of materials (metals,
plastics) on commodity markets. Since the subsidy is awarded for the de-
struction – officially termed “treatment” (chuli 处理) – of e-appliances, li-
censed companies are strongly incentivised to drop these objects in shred-
ders. It is the production of fractions (bits and pieces, powders, etc.) that
creates economic value. In contrast, small and independent actors – when
considered collectively – enjoy greater leeway and adopt a more diversified
strategy. Indeed, they tend to (in sequential order): reuse devices, repair
them, salvage components, and extract materials. (45) Material recovery, for
them, is only one option among others, not a necessity. Of course, appli-
ances that are broken beyond repair or outdated beyond resale serve only
as a source of materials. But if a device or component is still functional, or
in a good enough condition to make repair worthwhile, chances are that it
will be reused. (46) The neighbourhood repair shops (jiadian weixiu dian 家电
维修店) and markets for second-hand electronics (dianzi ershou shichang
电子二手市场 or dianzi cheng 电子城) that can be found everywhere in
China testify to this reality. Adam Minter even reports being told that, in
the recent past, business people in Guiyu and Taizhou made 80% of their
profit thanks to reuse. (47) This is not hard to understand. Functionality gives
manufactured products an added value compared to “raw” materials. By
preserving it, one can reap benefits, make more profit and, in turn, offer
higher purchasing prices. (48) This is the driving principle behind Guangdong’s
huge and lively markets for refurbished high-end smartphones and liquid
crystal displays. In sum, if “informal” actors prove to be more competitive
than “formal” ones, it is also because they are more flexible and manage to
realise more fully the market potential of each appliance. Here, so-called
“unfair” competition is actually backed by good business acumen.
Cathode-ray tube (CRT) television sets (TVs) are a good illustration of
how competition works out with regard to discarded e-appliances. TVs in
China have several important characteristics that distinguish them from
other types of appliance. First, they became common among the population
in the 1980s, at a time when refrigerators and washing machines were still
a luxury – not to mention air conditioners and computers. Compared to
these devices, CRT TVs have had a longer time to accumulate in households,
hotels, etc. Old TVs are therefore particularly widespread. Second, television
technology has recently gone through nothing short of a revolution. New
wide-screen devices equipped with a flat panel display (FPD) are light and
easy to carry, whereas, a few years back, CRT TVs of equivalent screen sizes
were extremely cumbersome. Third, the prices of FPD TVs have dropped sig-
nificantly in recent years, so that most people can afford to buy one nowa-
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days, at least in cities. As a result, the reuse market for old, bulky CRT TVs
has shrunk and continues to do so. In addition, the materials CRT TVs are
made of have little economic value. They include a lot of heavy leaded
glass (unmarketable), some plastics (low value), and only a little copper
(high value). Because of all these characteristics, CRT TVs are relatively
unattractive for business purposes. (49) Large-scale “formal” recyclers in
China thus face less competition and secure them more easily than other
devices, such as refrigerators, air conditioners, and washing machines –
not to mention computers and FPD TVs. Indeed, official figures indicate
that more than 80% of their total supply, on average, consists of CRT
TVs. (50) Admittedly, other factors also account for this product distribution
– for example, the fact that the subsidy for TVs is relatively high (85
yuan/unit) – but none of them plays as decisive a role as the low reuse
value of this type of e-appliance. The situation is entirely different if we
look at air conditioners or computers, for instance. One can easily find
second-hand markets in China that sell these types of appliances by the
thousands.
Thus, the fate of appliances, and the question of whose hands they even-
tually end up in, is largely determined by how much value can be drawn
out of them and how. A waste regime that fails to integrate this can only
be made effective through repressive measures. It may push parallel markets
underground, but is unlikely to eliminate them. (51)
Mobilising greenness
The transformation of China’s waste regime requires an important effort
on symbols and words. “Formal” actors dealing with used e-appliances not
only routinely accuse “informal” ones of unfair competition and environ-
mental damage, but also mobilise green propaganda as an instrument to
demarcate themselves from their competitors and gain a competitive edge. 
Academic experts, government officials, and representatives of big recy-
cling companies make great efforts to present China’s “formal system of
WEEE management” as the only viable solution for dealing with flows of
“e-waste” in a clean manner and, in doing so they draw heavily on ecological
ideology and iconography. The colour green, images of pristine natural land-
scapes, diagrams showing hermetic material loops and cycles, and concepts
such as the “circular economy” (xunhuan jingji 循环经济) and “ecological
civilisation” (shengtai wenming 生态文明) abound in corporate promotional
flyers and websites, academic publications, government policy papers, and
media reports. Significantly, big recycling companies are now commonly
referred to in China as “environmental protection companies” (huanbao
gongsi 环保公司) – as if their business consisted not so much in making a
profit by breaking objects, separating materials, and selling them, as in en-
suring the cleanliness of China’s air, ground, and water. Their contribution
to the safety and well-being of the population is sometimes stressed and
praised to such an extent that one almost forgets their fundamental nature
as for-profit ventures. This profusion of green propaganda serves the purpose
of making the proponents of China’s “formal system” appear as the only le-
gitimate actors of “e-waste management.”
But state-registered recycling companies are not nearly as green as they
claim to be. When digging through the crust of propaganda, one encounters
several inconsistencies. Firstly, as mentioned already, these companies sys-
tematically destroy objects, regardless of their reuse potential. (52) This clearly
contravenes the principle of “waste hierarchy” (also known as the “doctrine
of the 3Rs”), which stipulates that recycling should take place only as a last
resort, after attempts have been made, first, to reduce consumption, and
second, to reuse objects. International experts in environmental sciences
acknowledge that reuse should also be privileged in the case of “e-waste.” (53)
Secondly, big recycling companies in China face the same hurdles as every-
one else in dealing with materials that have little or no commercial value.
Most of them send leaded glass from CRT TVs to landfills or incinerators,
for instance, because too few applications – and therefore business oppor-
tunities – are available nowadays for this material. (54) Considering that a
single CRT tube includes up to two kilograms of lead, this amounts to mil-
lions of tons of highly toxic material that end up unrecycled every year.
Landfilling and incineration may be preferable to dumping, provided they
respect certain standards, but these techniques do not quite qualify as
“green,” and certainly not as “circular.” Thirdly, despite the MEP’s allegedly
“stringent requirements and controls,” many “formal” recyclers still lack the
complex depollution equipment required to ensure a neutral impact on the
environment. (55)
More generally, green propaganda should not make us oblivious to the
fact that transforming matter is never an entirely clean process. To be sure,
recycling old appliances is preferable to casting them aside and letting them
disintegrate. In some cases, using complex technologies and heavy industrial
equipment is necessary to thoroughly extract, segregate, purify, and stabilise
materials. (56) At the same time, however, breaking objects into pieces is like
opening Pandora’s Box: it unleashes substances that are hard to control af-
terwards. (57) A myriad of precautions must be taken in order to avoid un-
wanted consequences (i.e. contamination). No one can take them all, of
course, and there is ample evidence that licensed recycling plants in China
could do more in this field. Thus, claims of total greenness on the part of
proponents of the “formal system of e-waste management” should be taken
with a grain of salt.
Finally, it is crucial to stress that these claims originate in distorted com-
parisons between the “informal” and “formal” sectors. Dominant represen-
tations in favour of the latter are persuasive in large part because they rely
on a narrow perspective centred on material recovery. If other methods of
dealing with discarded e-appliances were factored into the analysis, the “in-
formal” sector would not look as bad as it currently does. Indeed, small eco-
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nomic actors engage in practices of reuse and repair on a large scale in China
– whereas, in general, large ones do not. (58) By doing so, they extend the
lifespan of huge amounts of discarded e-appliances and therefore prevent
these consumer goods from becoming “e-waste” to begin with. This makes
“e-waste management” and the production of new (replacement) devices
superfluous. (59) Therefore, many small economic actors actually contribute
to reducing the overall environmental impact of discarded e-appliances. In
principle, this should be acknowledged, even praised, in public discourse. Yet,
it is systematically ignored or downplayed in the face of a dominant dis-
course on pollution. 
Materials, modernity, and mass consumption
Why is China’s “formal system of e-waste management” centred on in-
dustrial-scale material recovery? In order to answer this question we must
look at where the people who devised it drew their inspiration. From the
outset, China’s national policies and regulations on “e-waste” were modelled
on those found in highly industrialised regions of the world, (60) where ma-
terial recovery has imposed itself as the preferred method for dealing with
discarded e-appliances. The main Chinese laws on “e-waste,” for instance,
draw on the European Union’s WEEE Directive, which was the first text to
regulate the issue of discarded e-appliances in a comprehensive way. To this
day, Chinese scientists and policy-makers continue to monitor and imitate
developments taking place “abroad” (guowai 国 外 ) – which invariably
means in countries with a high level of industrialisation. In conference talks,
these people systematically mention “developed” countries as a source of
inspiration. Likewise, paragraphs and chapters on “the status quo of WEEE
recycling in the United States” or “the latest situation in Japan” abound in
the Chinese scientific literature. (61) Comparing China with these countries
seems like a standard thing to do. Scientific and government experts do not
regard developments there solely as a source of new ideas; they wish to
emulate them. (62) Again and again, I heard them say: “We still have a long
way to go until we can [adopt the same regulations/enforce the same stan-
dards/use the same machines/etc.] as [Germany/Korea/Taiwan/Great
Britain/etc.], but we will get there eventually.” (63)
With such a mindset, Chinese experts take for granted that exclusive in-
dustrial-scale material recovery is the best way of dealing with discarded
e-appliances. The question of whether or not this method is appropriate to
the current situation in China becomes largely irrelevant. As a matter of
fact, some of the solutions favoured by Chinese policy-makers and their ad-
visors are not in line with existing needs and capabilities within the country.
An environmental engineer I interviewed told me, for instance, that in the
relatively near future, “the [Chinese] central government wants to have
high-tech specialised smelters, like those owned by Umicore [a multina-
tional company with headquarters in Belgium], although they cost hundreds
of millions of U.S. dollars and need to be fed with a lot of stuff, which China
doesn’t manage to collect through formal channels at the moment.” The
idea that other methods and technologies than those used by developed
countries may be more appropriate is thus ruled out.
The symbolic dimension of technologies also plays an important role.
Whether or not they are deemed attractive depends not only on the
achievements they enable, but also on what they stand for in the minds of
people, as the field of science-technology-society studies has amply
demonstrated. (64) Material recovery, as it is practiced in “developed” coun-
tries, has an aura of scientificity and innovation. It requires sophisticated
equipment, automated processes, expensive investments, abundant infor-
mation, elaborate laws, etc. – things that all evoke technological progress
and modernity. Among the various methods used to deal with discarded e-
appliances, it is certainly the one that fits best with China’s “medium- to
long-term plan” to become a world leader in science and technology by
2050. (65) Together with space programs and mega-projects in civil engineer-
ing, industrial-scale material recovery serves as a token of the country’s
modernity.
Material recovery’s success is also due to another of its characteristics: it
is compatible with increased consumption and production rates, unlike
other ways of drawing value out of discarded e-appliances. The more appli-
ances are bought, used, and discarded, the more business for recyclers. Con-
versely, the more appliances are crushed and transformed back into their
basic constituents, the more raw materials manufacturers have at their dis-
posal to produce new stuff. Whereas repair and reuse are likely to impinge
on sales of new devices, harm manufacturers’ interests, and slow down the
growth of the national electronics industry, material recovery serves the in-
terests of the manufacturing industry by making secondary raw materials
available sooner and in larger quantities. It is no coincidence that “formal”
collection schemes for old devices in China are often coupled with measures
aimed at increasing sales of new ones. The “Old-for-New” take-back
scheme, for instance, was designed not only to redirect “e-waste” from the
“informal” to the “formal” sector, but also to boost domestic consumption
in the face of a worldwide economic slowdown and a weakened demand
for manufactured goods in China’s export markets. (66) Similarly, some “for-
mal” recyclers buy back devices from consumers with credit – not cash –
that can only be used to purchase new consumers goods. (67)
On the whole, producers approve of China’s “formal management system”
for discarded e-appliances. The fact that it is based exclusively on indus-
trial-scale material recovery is in line with their fundamental interests, i.e.,
to sell a maximum quantity of goods. If large recycling plants were to wrest
discarded e-appliances entirely from the “informal” sector, reuse practices
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would vanish, or at least decrease drastically, and buying new devices would
become the only option left for consumers. At present, producers have to
pay a recycling tax on every e-appliance they put on the Chinese market,
but this has not triggered much opposition, for several reasons. First, the
tax has been set at a maximum of 13 yuan per item, (68) which accounts for
a small portion of the total price in most product categories. Second, pro-
ducers are encouraged by law to build their own recycling plants. (69) Several
major groups, among them TCL (TCL Jituan gufen youxian gongsi TCL 集团
股份有限公司) and Changhong (Sichuan Changhong dianzi jituan youxian
gongsi 四川长虹电子集团有限公司), took advantage of this option. It allows
them to recoup part of the expenditure: the manufacturing branch pays a
recycling tax, but the recycling branch receives some of this money back in
the form of subsidies. Even producers whose goods currently fail to appear
in “formal” recyclers’ shredders – e.g., air conditioners, printers, and mobile
phones – voice remarkably little discontent. A corporate representative
working for a multinational corporation, for instance, complained in private
about the lack of transparency in China’s tax system and made no secret
of her efforts to convince central government agencies to give producers
more leeway. But she did not fundamentally question the mechanism.
In sum, the waste regime currently being promoted at the institutional
level in China has clear connections with other state policies. It is congruent
with national plans for the development of science and technology, conso-
nant with the growing emphasis on ecological modernisation (70) and
techno-nationalism, (71) and compatible with higher production and con-
sumption rates, on which China relies for the development of its manufac-
turing industry as well as, more generally, for its economic growth.
Conclusion
In this paper, I argued that the path on which China has embarked in order
to solve its “e-waste problem” may well limit, or even eliminate, pollution
caused by certain forms of recycling, but certainly will not improve e-ap-
pliances’ overall environmental impact. The benefit of a more effective and
cleaner “waste management,” supposedly brought about by the country’s
new “formal system,” is offset by this system’s requirement that devices be
systematically destroyed, for this accelerates waste generation. In this sense,
the discourse of environmental protection, which serves to justify restruc-
turing the “e-waste” recycling sector, should not be taken at face value.
Above all, it is an asset that certain actors mobilise – alongside scientific
and media authority, state power, corporate funding, etc. – to advance their
own interests. By nurturing preconceptions of who is green and who is not,
large industrial groups seek to transform the market for used e-appliances
and gain an edge in the competition for access to valuable objects and
strategic materials. They enjoy support from the Chinese central govern-
ment, research institutes, and the media, who share a common definition
of recycling as the destruction of consumer goods and the creation of raw
materials.
Supplanting the actors who currently control the trade and transformation
of discarded e-appliances in China promises to be a difficult task. They have
accumulated experience over decades, are networked in intricate ways both
among themselves and with local political authorities, and most impor-
tantly, enjoy considerable freedom in the organisation of their business ac-
tivities. Their quest for profit shows that there are different ways of dealing
with discarded e-appliances and that the exclusive use of material recovery
is not only environmentally undesirable, but also economically unviable.
Using “e-waste” recycling as an entry point, this article described attempts
to put into practice the principle of a “circular economy.” We have seen that
concretely, implementing measures actually bolster larger and faster ma-
terial cycles. China’s goal of “ecological modernisation” implies transforming
its waste regime to make it more resource-intensive and therefore more
wasteful. No amount of green varnish will hide the fact that a holistic and
truly responsible approach to e-appliance’s overall environmental impact
is lacking in China – as is the case elsewhere in the world, unfortunately.
Viewed in this light, optimistic takes on the emergence of a “green state,” (72)
or “green capitalism,” (73) and on China’s privileged role as an incubator
thereof, take on a disquieting hollowness.
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